

CROSS and Restricted Decoding Problems



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Code-based Digital Signatures

Underlying problem is well trusted:

Syndrome Decoding Problem

Let parity-check matrix $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{(n-k) \times n}$, syndrome $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n-k}$ and weight w be given. Find an error vector $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ with $\mathbf{e}\mathbf{H}^\top = \mathbf{s}$ and $\text{wt}_{\mathbf{H}}(\mathbf{e}) = w$.



Zero Knowledge

No information on the secret is revealed.

Completeness

Honest prover always gets accepted.

Soundness

Negligible probability of accepting impersonators.

CROSS: Design Rationale [3]

Standard Optimizations

- PRNG and Merkle trees
- unbalanced challenges

EUFCMA Security

- Fiat-Shamir [4] transformed ZK-ID
- no further assumptions

Decoding Problem

- compact objects
- no trapdoor required



Efficient Arithmetic

- small Mersenne primes
- no permutations

International Team

- Clemson, PoliMI, TUM, UNIVPM
- www.cross-crypto.com

NIST Competition

- standardization process [5]
- one of 40 candidates

The Underlying Hard Problem


Generalization of the classical SDP [6]:

Restricted Syndrome Decoding Problem

Let $\mathbb{E} \subset \mathbb{F}_p^*$, $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{(n-k) \times n}$, and $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n-k}$. Find $\mathbf{e} \in (\mathbb{E} \cup \{0\})^n$ with $\mathbf{e}\mathbf{H}^\top = \mathbf{s}$ and $\text{wt}_{\mathbf{H}}(\mathbf{e}) = w$.

For security category 1, the parameters of CROSS are

- random codes with $p = 127$, $n = 127$, $k = 76$,
- error values in $\mathbb{E} = \{1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64\}$, and $w = n$.



Modifying the Hard Problem

- Error set $\mathbb{E} = \{g^i \mid i \in \{1, \dots, z\}\} \subset \mathbb{F}_p^*$ with $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ of prime order z .
- (\mathbb{E}^n, \star) is group w.r.t. component-wise multiplication of vectors, denoted by \star .
- A subgroup is compactly represented as $G = \{e = g^x \mid x\mathbf{M}^\top = \mathbf{0}\}$ with $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{F}_z^{(n-m) \times n}$.

Restricted Syndrome Decoding Problem with Subgroup G

Let $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{F}_z^{(n-m) \times n}$, $G = \{e = g^x \mid x\mathbf{M}^\top = \mathbf{0}\}$, $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{(n-k) \times n}$, and $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{n-k}$. Find a vector $\mathbf{e} \in G$ with $\mathbf{e}\mathbf{H}^\top = \mathbf{s}$.

\Rightarrow solution unique w.h.p. for $z^m < p^{n-k}$

Example for R-SDP(G) instance

For $p = 7$ and $z = 3$, $g = 2$ has order 3, i.e., the error set is given by

$$\mathbb{E} = \{g^0 = 1, g^1 = 2, g^2 = 4\} \subset \mathbb{F}_7.$$

Let $n = 5$. To define a subgroup of \mathbb{E}^5 of order $m = 3$, we can use the parity-check matrix

$$\mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 2 & 1 & 2 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \text{ for which } (1, 2, 0, 1, 2) \cdot \mathbf{M}^\top = (0, 0).$$

Then, a valid error vector is computed as $\mathbf{e} = (g^1 = 2, g^2 = 4, g^0 = 1, g^1 = 2, g^2 = 4) \in G$. This error is the unique solution of the instance given by


$$\mathbf{H} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 6 & 1 & 5 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 3 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{e} \cdot \mathbf{H}^\top = (2, 5).$$

For security category 1, the R-SDP(G) variant of CROSS uses

- random codes with $p = 509$, $n = 55$, $k = 36$,
- random subgroups with $z = 127$, $m = 25$.

A Meet-in-the-Middle Solver

Find subcodes of $\langle \mathbf{M} \rangle$ with support J_i of size $|J_i| = j_i$ and dimension $j_i - \rho_i$.



Computational Complexity

Let $P(j_i, \rho_i)$ denote the probability that a subcode with dimension $j_i - \rho_i$ and support size j_i exists. Denote as \mathcal{L}_i the list of errors e_i . Ignoring memory access cost and polynomial factors, the number of required operations is at least

$$\min_{J_1, J_2} \left\{ \frac{|\mathcal{L}_1| + |\mathcal{L}_2| + N_{\text{coll}}}{1 + z^m p^{k-n}} + \frac{1}{P(j_1, \rho_1) \cdot P(j_2, \rho_2)} \right\},$$

where the list size is $|\mathcal{L}_i| = z^{\rho_i}$, and the number of collisions is given by

$$N_{\text{coll}} = \frac{|\mathcal{L}_1| \cdot |\mathcal{L}_2|}{p^\ell \cdot z^{\ell'}},$$

since the effective syndromes sizes are $\ell = j_1 + j_2 - k$ and $\ell' = \max\{0, \rho_1 + \rho_2 - m\}$.

Further improvements?

References

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- [6] M. Baldi, M. Battaglioni, F. Chiaraluce, A.-L. Horlemann-Trautmann, E. Persichetti, P. Santini, V. Weger, (2020). "A new path to code-based signatures via identification schemes with restricted errors". arXiv preprint.